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I. Introduction
Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure
rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as
“an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568).
In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or
policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or
failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough:
the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and
mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures,
matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and
overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may
influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue
areas, governance systems, and time.
Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures,
executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy
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preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying,
campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law
that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the
ones that best pursue the public interest.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the
legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design.
It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called
public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores
how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement
policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The
positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape
policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.

II. Normative Mechanism Choice: Which Instruments Should We Choose?
A. In General
Mechanism choice is a kind of social “engineering,” the task of designing optimal
instruments to achieve social objectives (Maskin 2008: 567). But as the history of
engineering demonstrates (and as mechanism design theory corroborates), there is no
such thing as a perfect design. Every design involves choices among features that
correspond to tradeoffs among competing objectives (Petroski 2004).
In economics, a core concern is mechanism design in the face of incomplete information.
The significance of research addressing this concern is was reflected in the award of the
2007 Nobel Prize in economics to Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, and Leonid Hurwicz. If
preferences were known and outcomes were controllable, the designer could simply
mandate actions and results. But if the designer has incomplete information, s/he needs
some mechanism to achieve optimal results by eliciting from actors their private
information (honest preference revelation) via a mechanism design that is “incentive
compatible.” (Maskin 2008: 568, 571; Myerson 2008: 586-87). Neoclassical theory
argues that markets are presumptively best at this information-elicitation task, so long as
they are competitive, are free of significant externalities, and without information
asymmetries (Hayek 1945; Maskin 2008: 572).
But if markets are flawed or incomplete, due to problems such as externalities,
transaction costs, free riding, or incomplete information, then the theory of mechanism
design seeks to choose the best form of government intervention to correct the market
failure (Baliga & Maskin 2003). Such market failures in competition, externalities, and
information, and the need to correct for those failures, are among the basic rationales for
public law (Stiglitz 1989).
At the same time, government policies to correct market failures can pose their own
problems, that is, government failures. Incomplete information about preferences and
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outcomes also confronts government decision makers. Eliciting voters’ true preferences
through voting may be elusive or even unattainable (classic studies include Arrow 1963;
Gibbard 1973; and Satterthwaite 1975; more recent treatments include Barberá et al.
1997; Benoit 2000; Reny 2001). Foreseeing policy outcomes involves risk and
uncertainty, so government incurs the costs of information and analysis as it tries to
assess regulatory impacts in advance, and the costs of flaws in policy choices as they
arise over time. Government failures in policy design can include policies that are
excessively costly, that disproportionately benefit parochial constituencies at public
expense (rent-seeking) or government bureaucracies themselves (internalities), that
allocate burdens unfairly (inequity), or that induce adverse side effects (derived
externalities or risk-risk tradeoffs) (Wolf 1993; Graham & Wiener 1995; Mueller 2003).
The challenge for optimal policy is thus to minimize the sum of market failures and
government failures.
One response, not uncontroversial, to mitigating the problem of government failure is to
add a layer of supervisory oversight of the institutions developing policy interventions –
that is, a system of regulatory review of those regulating the public. In the United States,
this has been implemented through both judicial review (at least since the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946) and White House oversight of agency rulemaking (at least since
the administration of Jimmy Carter). President Carter issued Executive Order 12044 and
signed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, creating the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
President Reagan gave OIRA the power to apply benefit-cost analysis to regulatory
review under his EO 12291, and President Clinton reaffirmed that approach in his EO
12866 (with notable improvements). (See generally Breyer 1993; Kagan 2001; Graham
2007. For a recent critique, see Revesz & Livermore 2008). In early 2009, President
Obama called for a updating the system of regulatory review, and nominated legal
scholar Cass Sunstein to lead that effort. In the European Union, similar oversight
mechanisms have recently been established through the “Better Regulation” initiative that
created the Impact Assessment Board (Lindseth et al. 2008; Wiener 2006; Renda 2006)
and greater use of judicial review of administrative action (Lindseth et al. 2008;
Alemanno 2008). Internationally, regulatory oversight occurs in institutions including,
notably, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute resolution bodies.
Such oversight of regulatory design is a partial answer to the Roman poet Juvenal’s
ageless question, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (“who will watch the watchers,” or
“who will guard the guardians?”). It is only a partial answer because the additional
oversight introduces another layer of costs (especially delay) and because the oversight
body itself may require watching. To avoid an infinite regress of oversight bodies, a
system of transparency and of checks and balances, including public participation
through elections and perhaps litigation, can help those being watched (that is, the public,
regulated entities, and advocacy groups) also help watch the watchers (the oversight
bodies) of the watchers (the regulators) (Hurwicz 2008).

B. The Regulator’s Toolbox
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Together, these contending concerns and institutions shape the choice of regulatory
mechanisms. Policymakers and academics collectively have developed a large menu or
“toolbox” of instruments to correct for market failures.
Perhaps the most common regulatory mechanism in historical practice has been the
imposition of conduct standards, in which government specifies the behavior or
technology that firms must adopt. Examples include administrative regulations
mandating technological standards (such as pollution filters or types of fish nets). But the
long history of research on mechanism design has developed many alternatives to
conduct-specifying regulations, including taxes and subsidies (Pigou 1920; Weitzman
1974), property rights (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967; Hardin 1968; Libecap 1989), tradable
allowances or “cap and trade” (Crocker 1966, Dales 1968, Montgomery 1972; Ackerman
& Stewart 1985; Tietenberg 1990; Wiener 1999a; Stavins 2003; Tietenberg 2006;
Tietenberg 2007), tax-allowance hybrids (Roberts & Spence 1976), information
disclosure (Hamilton 2005), process-enhancing procedures (Richman & Boerner 2006),
regulatory “nudges” that guide cognitive heuristics (Thaler & Sunstein 2008), and
bureaucratic control (Williamson 1999).
Each of these policy instruments has associated pros and cons; none is a costless
intervention or perfectly efficient solution. The challenge is to develop criteria and
evaluation methods that identify the policy instruments that would be comparatively
superior to achieve particular social objectives under particular market conditions. We
discuss these criteria further below.
To flesh out the menu of mechanism choices in the regulator’s toolbox a bit further, it
includes at least the following six types of instruments:
1. Conduct rules
These instruments involve government commands to firms and individuals,
prescribing specific technologies, practices, methods, or behaviors that must be
employed or must be avoided. These instruments mandate conduct, rather than
outcomes. (Related labels have included “command and control,” design
standards, and technology-based regulation.) Examples include administrative
regulations mandating prescriptive design standards for technology to employ
(e.g. pollution filters, catalytic converters, types of boilers or fuels, standards in
information and communications technology) or technology to avoid (e.g. types
of fish nets).
The judicial version of conduct rules was reflected in the traditional negligence
standard in civil tort liability, in which “due care” is defined as particular conduct
or technology that private actors must adopt. This is still the approach in some
areas of law, such as medical malpractice. The more modern version of the
negligence standard defines due care as “reasonable” conduct, evaluated by a
benefit-cost test that asks if the marginal costs of precaution are justified by

4

marginal benefits of precaution, but leaving flexibility to private actors in how
best to undertake precautions.
2. Quantity/Property rules
These instruments limit the use of a resource or entry into a market by setting a
quantity limit on such use or giving a property rightsholder the right to exclude.
If the market failure is overuse of an open-access resource (such a grazing
commons, a fishery, or the atmosphere) that imposes external harms on others,
then quantity/property instruments can remedy such failures by limiting access to
the socially optimal amount.
Such limits might involve spatial parceling of a resource (“private property”), or
limited permits to use a resource, or limits on entry into a market. They include
property rights (such as rights to land, objects, minerals, airspace, and patents and
copyrights), ambient standards (limiting the concentration or abundance of use or
of pollution), emissions or effluent standards (limiting the amount of additional
pollution that can be added in a period of time), and use or extraction licenses
(such as for patents, copyrights, fishing and hunting licenses, airplane tickets, and
broadcast spectrum licenses). Quantity use limits can be fixed (non-transferable)
performance standards (e.g. fixed pollution limits, highway speed limits, or
airplane tickets); or they can be transferable among users in a system of tradable
permits or tradable allowances (also called “cap and trade”; e.g. pollution
emissions allowances, fisheries catch quotas, broadcast spectrum licenses, and
aviation landing slots).
Tradable allowances can be issued by the government to private actors for free
(such as “grandfathered” in proportion to historical users), or they can be sold or
auctioned by the government to raise revenues and help offset the cost of the
regulatory restriction (Goulder et al. 1997; Parry 1995), or some mixture of free
and auctioned allowances can be designed. A significant focus of the economics
of mechanism design involves the design of auctions to try to elicit honest
preference revelation by bidders (e.g. Athey & Levin 2001).
Another key consideration in cap and trade policies, constraining costs, is
discussed in the next section regarding the comparison between taxes and tradable
allowances.
Critics of incentive-based instruments such as tradable allowance mechanisms
have worried that these instruments may lead to “hotspots” of concentrated
pollution (e.g. if one firm purchases many allowances), may soften the stigma
associated with polluting by “licensing the right to pollute,” and may have high
administrative costs. Advocates of tradable allowances respond that hotspots are
unlikely if the aggregate cap is stringent, that hotspots depend on local emissions
causing local harms (which is not the case, for example, with most greenhouse
gases), and that hotspots can be limited through the design of the allowance
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trading system to restrict high ambient levels. They add that far from licensing
the right to pollute, incentive instruments like taxes and tradable allowances make
polluters pay for every unit of pollution (whereas command technology standards
and fixed performance standards allow residual pollution to be emitted for free),
and do better at motivating innovation, thus reducing pollution more effectively.
And advocates argue that the administrative costs of incentive instruments
(chiefly monitoring emissions and collecting taxes or tracking allowance trades)
are no higher than for command technology standards (developing engineering
analyses of best technologies and litigating those choices), and in any event are
dwarfed by the social cost savings delivered by incentive instruments.
3. Price/Liability rules
These instruments limit use of a resource not by limiting the quantity or spatial
terms of use, but by setting a price on use. If the market failure is overuse of the
resource, then price/liability instruments can remedy that problem by setting a
price for use that equals the social marginal harm of use. Such price instruments
include taxes on use, subsidies for abatement, and strict liability in tort.
A classic contrast pits between taxes versus tradable allowances. Under a
quantity-based system of tradable allowances, government sets the aggregate
quantity of use, and the market then determines the price of an allowance. By
contrast, under a tax, government sets the price for use, and the market then
determines the quantity of use. As Weitzman (1974) showed, if the government
knows the true marginal cost of abatement, then it can set either the quantity or
the price and achieve the same result. But under uncertainty about the true
marginal cost curve, the quantity instrument risks fluctuations in the cost of use,
and the price instrument risks fluctuations in the quantity of use. Which
instrument is preferable depends (all other things equal) on whether one is more
concerned about the costs escalating or the use escalating (that is, on the relative
slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves).
If cost escalation is a key concern (favoring a tax), but a quantity limit on total use
is desirable or taken as given, then a quantity-based tradable allowance system
can be designed to constrain costs in several ways: setting the stringency of the
quantity cap appropriately (not too tight); enabling firms to enjoy “how”
flexibility in methods of abatement, “where” flexibility in the location of
abatement across users, and “when” flexibility through banking and borrowing
over time; ensuring a broad and competitive market for allowances; and setting
price ceilings (“safety valves”) at which extra allowances will be sold (i.e., by
creating a tax-allowance hybrid instrument) (Roberts & Spence 1976), perhaps
coupled with price floors that maintain at least some incentive for innovation and
also help constrain price volatility in both directions (Burtraw et al. 2009).
Taxes raise revenues; as noted above, tradable quantity allowances can also raise
revenues by being sold or auctioned.
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A key difference between taxes and tradable allowances is their ability to engage
participation by users, especially where the voting rule for adoption of the policy
requires consent to be bound (as it does at the international level). This feature is
discussed further in Part III below.
Subsidies also act as price instruments, by offering users a payment to abate
(hence a foregone payment from failure to abate), or by supporting basic research
and development (R&D) in which private firms would not invest adequately.
Subsidies for abatement can reduce resource use at the margin, but unlike taxes or
tradable allowances, they may also reduce the average cost of operating in the
subsidized industry and thereby attract greater investment that perversely
increases output in that sector (Oates 1990). Subsidies for basic R&D can help
overcome the market failure in incentives for innovation, but unless the price of
the new technologies can be driven down below the price of conventional
technologies, the R&D subsidy will need to be paired with some instrument (such
as a tax or tradable allowance system) to correct the market failure in resource use
by internalizing the external costs of the conventional technologies and thus to
encourage diffusion and adoption of the new technologies (Jaffe et al. 2005;
Pezzey et al. 2008). And government subsidies for the deployment of particular
technologies run the risk of picking a losing technology.
4. Information disclosure rules.
If the market failure involves asymmetric information, or obstacles to bargaining
because of incomplete information, then an information disclosure instrument can
help remedy the problem and facilitate more efficient market transactions.
Information, transparency, labeling, and related instruments are widespread. For
example, information disclosure is currently required in sales of securities, sales
and leases of real estate, loans, sales of and consumer products (such as
appliances, motor vehicles, food, prescription and over-the-counter drugs). Some
of these disclosure requirements are highly detailed. Additional versions of
information instruments include Environmental Impact Statements, Regulatory
Impact Assessments, the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, and the Toxics
Release Inventory (Hamilton 2005). The function of regulatory oversight itself
involves disclosure of decisionmaking rationales and evidence – by the agency in
its notice and comment rulemaking process, by OIRA, and by the courts through
judicial proceedings.
5. Government ownership
If regulation of market transactions is not sufficient, government can acquire
ownership of a resource or enterprise. Government may acquire ownership
through negotiated purchase, or through the power of eminent domain to take
property (and pay compensation). Public parks and lands, public works and
utilities, and various services (including the Postal Service, Amtrak, and air traffic
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control) are currently operated by the public sector in the USA; various sectors
are government-owned in other countries. Market failures in financial markets
have recently led to increased government ownership of banks, lenders, and
insurers. Government ownership may enable wider public access to resources,
but it may also replace market incentives to invest in conservation of resources
with bureaucratic procedures that let resource values dissipate or become captured
by private users. Government acquisition or compensation in response to private
losses can create an expectation of relief that generates “moral hazard,” excessive
risk-taking by the insured (Akerlof & Romer 1994).
6. Private ordering
Industry custom, trade association codes of conduct, professional codes, and
group property management systems are all examples of mechanisms that private
actors may adopt to regulate conduct. Where actors face low transaction costs of
developing, agreeing on, monitoring and enforcing such codes, they can be
attractive mechanisms (Ostrom 1990; Ellickson 1990). The question of
instrument choice remains: private codes of conduct and social norms typically
take one of the mechanism design options described above.
The relationship between government policy and private ordering may vary. In
some cases, government adoption of regulatory policy may supersede or crowd
out private codes and norms. In these cases, private codes are sometimes meant
to fend off government regulation; an example is the history of self-regulation by
the movie industry meant to avoid government-imposed content ratings or
restrictions. In other cases, government policy may serve an expressive function
that helps establish and strengthen social norms.
Other instruments are also possible. For example, Dijkstra (1999) classifies education
and training as a regulatory instrument.

C. Criteria for Optimal Instrument Choice
As a general matter, there is no single universally optimal mechanism or policy
instrument, because the choice is pragmatic, involves several considerations, and is
largely driven by the attributes of the specific market failure (Breyer 1982; Baumol &
Oates 1988). The economics and legal literatures have offered useful, though not
exhaustive, theories for optimal mechanism choice, the process of selecting the optimal
instrument to correct a particular problem.
Perhaps the most common method of normative mechanism selection, at least as
advocated by economists and invoked by OMB regulatory review, is benefit-cost analysis
(Stokey & Zeckhauser 1978; Munger 2000). The debate over benefit-cost analysis is
extensive; it goes beyond the scope of this chapter, because benefit-cost analysis seeks to
answer how much regulation is desirable, whereas mechanism choice typically seeks to
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select the best policy instrument to achieve a given degree or objective of regulation
(with that goal having been given by the legislature). Thus, mechanism choice in
regulatory policy often involves cost-effectiveness analysis rather than full benefit-cost
analysis.
In either case, a full analysis of benefits or effectiveness would include both targeted and
ancillary consequences (Graham & Wiener 1995; Revesz & Livermore 2008); and a full
analysis of costs would include compliance costs, general equilibrium social costs
(Hazilla & Kopp 1990), and administrative costs (Ackerman & Stewart 1988). A full
analysis of benefits and costs would also include dynamic considerations, such as the
degree to which an instrument spurs innovation (Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, 2003) or
encourages absorbing new information and adapting to changing circumstances.
Distributional criteria, such as fairness or justice, can also inform a benefit-cost
comparison of alternative mechanisms and policy outcomes. Benefit-cost analysis can
aim to maximize aggregate net benefits (the Kaldor-Hicks criterion), or can be applied to
a more stringent test that would maximize net benefits while also ensuring that no
individual is made worse off (Pareto-improving), by combining the optimal choice with
compensatory side payments from its winners to its losers. Broader versions of benefitcost analysis embrace all of these considerations, and both qualitative as well as
quantitative analysis, in a “cognitive” or “warm” approach to pragmatic decision making
that sees benefit-cost analysis as a tool, not a rule, to inform sound judgment by
responsible officials (Sunstein 2000; Farber 1999; Wiener 2006; Graham 2008).
On these criteria, many economists argue that for most externality problems (such as
pollution), incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradable allowance (cap and
trade) systems are superior to conduct rules that specify behavior or technology.
Incentive-based instruments achieve results at lower cost, through “how,” “where” and
“when” flexibility (as described above). Moreover, incentive-based instruments
stimulate continuous innovation, while command technology standards may stagnate
innovation once the government-selected technology has been adopted (Jaffe, Newell &
Stavins 2003). (For surveys of instrument choice comparisons across diverse criteria, see
Baumol & Oates 1988; Wiener 1999a.)
Law and economics scholars have developed additional theories to guide optimal
instrument choice. For example, Calabresi & Melamed (1972) developed a template for
when property rules are superior to liability rules, focusing on transaction costs and
judicial errors. Weitzman (1974) identified tradeoffs between price instruments (such as
taxes) and quantity instruments (such as tradable permits) when the decision maker is
uncertain about costs and benefits. Breyer (1982) described how matching the type of
policy instrument to different types of problems can help solve market failures. Stewart
(1986) emphasized the basic choice in public law between replacing markets with
bureaucratic controls, versus “reconstituting” markets through incentive-based
regulations that exact performance while preserving substantial flexibility to market
actors. Baumol & Oates (1988) synthesized the economics literature on optimal
instrument choice for environmental protection. Williamson (1999) employed new
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institutional economics to suggest when economic and political transactions require
administrative management, including regulation or public agencies.
In addition, to supplement and test the predictions of ex ante prospective assessments of
instrument design, the empirical (ex post or retrospective) study of the actual impacts of
instrument design has been growing. For many years few such retrospective studies were
undertaken; according to a GAO report in 1999, of the more than 100 major rules issued
by EPA from 1981 to 1998, only five were subject to ex post evaluations, with all of
those five reviews occurring after 1997 (GAO 1999). In recent years, retrospective
studies have been undertaken more frequently. One such study found that ex ante
assessments tend to overpredict both the costs and the benefits of regulation, but that the
costs of market-based incentive policies tended to be even more overstated than the costs
of command and control technology standards (Harrington, Morgenstern & Nelson,
2000) – put another way, that market-based incentive instruments are an even better
option than is typically predicted. Like ex ante assessments, retrospective studies remain
challenged by the need to estimate counterfactual scenarios of what would have happened
absent the policy (Coglianese 2002; Hammitt 2006).
Retrospective or ex post studies (or real time monitoring) can be useful in at least two
ways: validating and improving the methods of ex ante assessment to help them become
more accurate predictions; and informing the process of updating and revising policies in
light of new information (see Wiener 2006: 513-16). The latter function – learning and
revising policies – is an important part of the dynamic considerations in the normative
choice among instruments, as noted just above. That is, not only should the normative
choice among instruments consider which instrument best promotes dynamic
technological and behavioral change in society, but it should also consider the dynamic
adaptability of the instrument itself as we learn about its performance over time (Farber
1994; Ruhl 2005; Wiener 2004).
Different instruments may be more or less adaptable, or more likely to adapt in different
ways, as circumstances change. Put another way, the positive political economy of
regulation continues after adoption and during implementation, which in turn may be
relevant to the normative choice of initial adoption. For example, consider the choice
between a tax versus a cap and trade system to reduce pollution. Under a tax, every
taxpayer has an incentive to lobby to relax or remove the tax. And the tax authority,
seeking revenues, has an incentive to keep the taxed activity going and generating tax
revenues, and thus to set a revenue-maximizing tax that is lower (less stringent) than the
optimal externality-controlling tax (Breyer 1982: 284; Bohm & Russell 1985: 437;
Keohane et al. 1998: 314-15). These forces combine to yield pollution taxes that are
suboptimally low. Under cap and trade, by contrast, allowance holders quickly constitute
a new constituency which will lobby in favor of keeping the allowances scarce – that is,
in favor of enforcement of the cap – because lax enforcement means that their allowances
lose value. (An example is taxicab medallions in New York City: the city allocated just
fewer than 12,000 taxi medallions in 1937, and, under pressure from medallion owners,
forestalled the issuance of any additional medallions until 60 years later, when the city
added just 400 in 1996 (The Economist 1996).) Under thuese conditions, a cap and trade
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system seems less likely to be relaxed through political pressure than is a tax. If new
information indicates that a more stringent limit on pollution is desirable than was
initially adopted, the cap and trade system would then be more optimally adaptable than
the tax; but if new information indicates that a less stringent limit is desirable, the cap and
trade system might be less adaptable than the tax.
Accordingly, instrument designers should build into initial instrument designs some kind
of mechanisms for adaptive management – such as for periodic review of the stringency
of the cap and whether it should be tightened or loosened in light of new information.
Moreover, this dynamic adaptive consideration returns us to the initial problem of
“mechanism design”: how to design instruments that are incentive compatible and elicit
accurate information about costs and preferences. Because preferences, as well as
technologies and environmental conditions, can change over time, the instrument
designer should build into initial instrument designs some mechanism to learn about all
of these changes and adapt over time.
In sum, normative evaluations of policy instruments rest on a wealth of valuable
theoretical criteria, and emerging empirical research. Yet actual policy choices often
depart from normative guidance. It is therefore important to understand the positive
political processes that select actual policy instruments, the topic of the next section.

III. Positive Mechanism Choice: Which Instruments Actually Get Chosen?
The main question posed by the robust political economy literature on positive
mechanism choice is whether positive political forces actually choose the instruments
deemed optimal by normative analysis, or instead depart from the optimal choice to
employ some other (suboptimal) instrument. If positive politics do affect the process of
mechanism choice, then political forces predictably constrain policy options or raise the
costs of certain policy instruments. Accordingly, understanding these political
constraints (which may be impossible or too costly to change) should inform the
normative instrument choice analysis. As James Buchanan advised, one should
understand the political system before prescribing normative instrument choice
(Buchanan 1987).
Views of the political process vary widely, and instrument choice predictions depend
heavily on the underlying model of the political system. Here we focus on instrument
choice in the United States given its particular set of political institutions and players. In
this section, we begin with optimistic models in which positive instrument choice
emulates optimal normative choice. Then we move to more pessimistic models in which
positive instrument choice departs from optimal normative choice. At each step, we
assess the relevant empirical evidence and consider complications to positive models; we
also address the politics of both administrative regulation and property rights. Further,
we examine the roles of public attitudes that might produce results that are more mixed
and nuanced than either the highly optimistic or highly pessimistic models. Last, after
focusing on positive instrument choice in the United States, we comment on positive
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instrument choice in international treaties and in the European Union, in order to offer
some comparative perspective on the role of basic institutional structures (such as voting
rules) in shaping positive choices.

A. Optimal Choice
If all individuals’ interests are effectively represented in the political system, positive
mechanism choice may emulate the normative criteria for maximizing net benefits (and
perhaps even compensating losers). Lowi (1979) advanced a vision of pluralist
democracy in which all citizens’ interests are expressed through organized interest
groups, and government decisions thus optimally aggregate and reconcile citizens’
preferences. Aidt (1998) arrived at the same socially optimal outcome through a more
formal model, in which every individual is effectively represented by an interest group.
Even if all individuals are not effectively or equally represented by interest groups,
optimal choice is still possible. Becker (1983, 1985) showed that if the political process
is a frictionless competition among interest groups, organized interests will bargain for
their desired policy outcomes and, in order to secure adoption of their preferred
programs, will propose policy mechanisms that reduce the costs (prices) of achieving
their objectives. This competitive bidding process dissipates the interest groups’ rents,
and socially optimal policies result. Similar intuitions underlie Wittman (1995) and
Cowen (1994).
Many observers doubt that such optimistic models depict the reality of American politics.
Olson (1971) and others had argued that disorganized or diffuse interests would be
unequipped to bargain effectively against concentrated interest groups. North (1990)
argued that Becker's model is unrealistic because significant transaction costs of
expressing political voice make political influence difficult and unevenly available (see
also Mashaw 1997). Hahn (1989: 173-75) observed that, at least through 1989, Becker's
optimism had not been borne out empirically in environmental regulation, where
suboptimal instruments had often dominated the field (although since 1989, incentivebased instruments for environmental protection have become more widely adopted, see
Stewart 2001, Oates & Portney 2003, and further discussion below).
Recently, Croley (2008) has argued that optimistic pluralist models do depict the reality
of actual American policy making, provided that the instrument choice and policy
process are adequately shielded from the interest group biases of concern to Olson,
North, Mashaw, and others. For example, Croley finds that separating regulatory
agencies from the Congress, and requiring administrative procedures to transparently and
honestly execute benefit-cost analysis, can ensure that regulation achieves public interest
benefits. From a different institutional vantage point, Demsetz (1967) argued that
bottom-up norms and judicial protections (rather than top-down legislative and
administrative safeguards) can ensure the emergence of optimal policy instruments.
Demsetz depicted the evolution of property rights as a process driven by the quest for net
benefits, in which open-access resources become regulated by the establishment of
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property rights to exclude, whenever the benefits of internalizing externalities rise to
exceed the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights.

B. Suboptimal Choice
1. The Olson Model
A more popular, and less sanguine, view of the political process was crystallized by
Mancur Olson’s classic, The Logic of Collective Action (1971), first published in 1965.
In Olson’s framework, political voice itself is a collective good that is restrained by
transaction costs and is thus subject to the difficulty of mobilizing collective action. In
contrast to optimistic models such as Aidt (1998), in Olson’s framework, public
preferences are incompletely represented by interest groups. Interest groups have little
incentive to lobby for nonexcludable benefits that will be reaped by others, so they
advocate only or at least mainly for excludable benefits they can appropriate to their
members. Members and groups prefer to free ride on nonexcludable benefits generated
by others, so they underinvest in promoting legislation that would yield diffuse general
interest benefits (and they underinvest in resisting legislation that would impose diffuse
costs). The result is that concentrated interest groups are able to obtain their own benefits
and extract rents at a cost to diffusely held interests.
The public choice literature contains numerous applications of Olson’s interest group
theory to explain legislation and agency policies that benefit industry at the expense of
the general public. Early work in political science accused the railroads (Kolko 1960)
and military suppliers (Gerschenkron 1945) of distorting the democratic process to obtain
legislation serving their narrow interests. A key concern in the 1960s was the problem of
agency capture by regulated industry. Earlier economic models of democracy had been
developed by Bentley (1908) and Downs (1957). What Olson (1971) added was an
account of incentives, appropriability (excludability) and free riding in the political
domain that helped formalize and generalize the analysis, showing that political voice
itself can have public goods characteristics and thus go underprovided unless it is paired
with private rewards. Stigler (1971, 1975) and Peltzman (1976) took an analogous
approach to explain economic regulation that favors concentrated interests over diffuse
public interests, such as licensing regulations that restrict entry to markets and raise
prices to consumers. Buchanan & Tullock (1975) applied this theory to explain the
emergence of policy instruments that reflect incumbent industry members’ preference for
command-and-control standards rather than taxes or auctioned allowances, because taxes
or auctioned allowances force industry to pay for their residual uncontrolled emissions,
whereas command technology standards do not; thus, they argued, the prevalence of
command technology standards in 1970s-era environmental law can be attributed to
industry’s concentrated interest and political voice.
Wilson (1984) and Eskridge (1988) emphasized that Olson’s theory predicts more than
just overprovision of narrow rent-seeking legislation that provides concentrated benefits
to a few while imposing diffuse costs on the public. It also predicts underprovision of
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general interest legislation that provides diffuse benefits while imposing costs on
concentrated interests. Moreover, Olson’s theory forecasts ambiguous results in cases of
diffuse benefits and diffuse costs, and delegation to another body (such as a regulatory
agency) in cases of concentrated benefits and concentrated costs.
2. Theory Meets Evidence
One significant challenge to Olson’s interest group theory is the empirical reality that
much legislation has been enacted that yields diffuse general benefits while imposing
costs on industry, such as environmental law and antitrust law, and the simultaneous
reality that some economic regulation protecting concentrated industry interests has been
undone. There are at least two possibilities to explain this reality: either the Olson
theory fails to describe actual politics, or seemingly general-interest legislation is not as
general-benefit oriented as it seems (and is actually driven by parochial rent-seeking).
On the first possibility, many critics challenge the core of the Olson approach, arguing
that the theory is too simplistic to capture the reality of the emergence of general benefits
legislation. For example, Farber (1992: 60) observes: “The Olson paradigm appears to
have a straightforward implication for environmental legislation: there should not be
any.... [T]he two basic predictions [of Olson's model] are that environmental groups will
not organize effectively and that environmental statutes will not be passed.” Revesz
(1997: 561) says: “it is difficult to explain, in public choice terms, why there would be
any environmental regulation at all.” Schuck (1997: 566) considers the emergence of
modern environmental law to be a “major predictive error of the new public choice
theorists.” Oates & Portney (2003) comment: “In fact, from [the Olson] perspective,
what does seem surprising is the extent to which environmental advocacy groups have
mobilized their constituencies so effectively. The benefits from programs to improve air
quality on a national scale, for example, would appear to represent an Olsonian largegroup case, where it would be extremely difficult to organize environmental interests. But
in seeming contradiction to the prediction of the theory, environmental groups have
proved to be a very powerful force in the policy arena.” These criticisms join earlier
observations that environmental law was an especially difficult case to explain with
standard public choice theory (Posner 1974; Elliott, Ackerman & Millian 1985). The
strong form of the Olson theory thus seems unable to explain, or at least seems to
underpredict, the adoption of general-interest legislation such as environmental and
consumer protection. Perhaps the inference to draw is that the general interest legislation
that arises is the product of episodic abnormal politics, as we discuss below; and that
Olson’s theory of normal politics favoring concentrated interests implies that,
normatively, we would be even better off if we could have even more general interest
legislation than we get in reality.
Similarly, much of the history of US economic regulation and deregulation in the 1970s
cuts against the Olson theory. Whereas Olson, Wilson and Stigler predicted the lack of
general interest legislation and the prevalence of legislation favoring concentrated
interests, the 1970s exhibited the opposite: the rise of (ostensibly) general interest
environmental and consumer regulation and the nearly simultaneous deregulation of rules
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shielding incumbent industry interests against competition. Horwitz (1989) recounts the
repeal or reform of the very economic regulations in banking, transportation, and
communications that the Olson/Wilson/Stigler theory predicted would be most dear to
industry because those rules had delivered benefits to concentrated industry and had
imposed diffuse costs on consumers. McCraw (1984) documents a similar political story
when certain deregulation efforts removed benefits from concentrated interests and
bestowed general benefits on consumers. To be sure, some other economic regulations
have remained in place, including government relief policies that may benefit risk-taking
banks over the general public (Akerlof & Romer 1994); and the partial deregulation of
financial services in the last decade may reflect intra-industry rivalry and regulatory
capture (Hardy 2006). But the juxtaposition of sustained environmental regulation and
significant economic deregulation still presents a strong challenge to the basic Olson
model.
More generally, critics have doubted that focusing on industry’s parochial gains offers an
adequate account of observed political outcomes, in part because so many other variables
are also in play. This suggests that Olson’s model suffers from foundational theoretical
problems. Attributing observed political choices solely to industry lobbying may be a
fallacy of “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” (Mashaw 1997: 203). Breyer (1982: 388 n.38)
remarks: “Interest group theories, as causal explanations of either the historical origins of
regulation or the actions of regulators, suffer several drawbacks. Where they are limited
to producers [i.e., industry], they are often inaccurate. They cannot fully explain
environmental, health, [and] safety regulation.... If the theory is expanded beyond
producers, it risks becoming nonpredictive and nonexplanatory. All regulatory rules and
programs benefit some group or other.” (See also Breyer 1984: 282, quipping that
interest group theory is uninteresting where it is true, and untrue where it is interesting.)
Noll (1989: 1277) worries that “the evidence is still far from fully conclusive. . . . [There]
is the lurking danger of tautology, i.e., of attributing causality to an inevitable
consequence of any public policy action. It is impossible to imagine that regulation could
be imposed without redistributing income. Hence, a look for winners in the process--and
organizations that represent them--is virtually certain to succeed. Until fundamental
measurement problems about stakes, power, and gains are overcome, analysts will not be
able fully to predict and to explain the details of regulatory policy.”
Alternatively, there is substantial evidence of the second possible reconciliation of Olson
with the evidence: that the seemingly general-interest legislation that has been enacted is
actually the result of the rent-seeking pursuit of parochial interests. Many studies observe
that economic interests routinely use purportedly general interest regulation to raise their
rivals’ costs (on the general theory, see Salop & Scheffman (1983); Salop et al. (1984);
Tollison (1991)). For example, Ackerman & Hassler (1981) found that the sulfur
dioxide air pollution regulations in the 1977 Clean Air Act required command technology
standards (scrubbers) that favored high-sulfur eastern coal over low-sulfur western coal.
Incentive-based instruments such as taxes or allowance trading would have removed this
parochial advantage. In their view, this distortion of instrument choice was a victory for
eastern coal, not for clean air. Pashigian (1985) investigated the same statute and found
that the “prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) provision enacted in 1977,
ostensibly to preserve clean air in areas with already good air quality, was adopted by the
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votes of northern rustbelt states with poor air quality over the dissenting votes of southern
and southwestern sunbelt states with good air quality. He inferred that PSD was imposed
(through majority vote) by the rustbelt states in order to suppress economic growth in,
and industry relocation to, their cleaner rivals in the sunbelt. Along similar lines, Bartel
& Thomas (1987) found evidence that OSHA and EPA regulations protect large firms
and rust-belt firms against smaller firms and sun-belt firms. And in a different topical
domain, McChesney & Shugart (1995) argue that antitrust law, while ostensibly
promoting the general interest, has been captured to deliver special interest protections to
industry segments.
Another intra-industry strategy is to seek regulations that protect existing incumbents
against the threat of new entrants. This strategy arguably accounts in part for the
“new/old” distinctions in many regulatory instruments. New entrants tend not to exist or
are not yet well organized politically, so, following Olson, they lose out in the political
process to well-organized incumbents with concentrated interests. For example,
Gruenspecht (1982) explained the preference of the current automobile manufacturing
industry for more stringent restrictions on new sources of vehicle emissions. A similar
strategy by incumbents could help explain the tighter regulations imposed on new
stationary sources of air pollution, including “new source review” and more stringent
technology-based controls at new or modified sources. Such a pattern of incumbent
protection might also explain allowance trading systems with “free allocation” to current
users, obliging new entrants to pay to receive permits or to purchase them from
incumbents.
Evidence of rent-seeking in the development and design of administrative regulation
finds a parallel in studies that view the development of property rights as a rent-seeking
strategy. Whereas Demsetz (1967), as noted above, proposed an optimistic story of
maximizing net benefits to explain the evolution of property rights to regulate resources,
other scholars see a more coercive element of interest group politics in the evolutionary
story. In these versions, the definition and allocation of property rights is subject to
political pressures. Levmore (2002) tells a second evolutionary story that focuses on
politics and rent-seeking, including examples in the development of intellectual property
rights. Wyman (2005) offers a similar account of politics and state power regarding the
evolution of property rights in fisheries. Libecap (2007) observes that the firstpossession or first-appropriation methods of assigning property rights that are often
applied to oil and gas, water, radio spectrum, pollutant emissions, and fishery ITQs, –
rather than auctions or uniform allocations, which often are more efficient – tend to arise
to protect incumbents. These political explanations of supposedly general-interest
property rules are consistent with the Olson theory.
Thus, once competing intra-industry interests are appreciated, the evidence for and
against the Olson theory of interest group politics presents a mixed picture:
underprediction of general interest legislation (much enacted), overprediction of
parochial economic regulation (much deregulated), and yet potentially accurate
prediction of intra-industry rivalry embedded in both sets of policies.
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3. More Complex Models
The models of positive choice discussed thus far have focused on the demand for
regulation and particular regulatory instruments, and they have focused especially on
organized private interest groups as political actors that demand regulation. More
complex models of positive politics look at a wider set of actors on the demand side, such
as advocacy groups and political entrepreneurs, and also give attention to the supply side
of legislation, such as legislators and regulators.
Accounting for the role of advocacy groups that lobby for public interest regulation is not
straightforward. On Olson’s account, such groups should have difficulty organizing
effectively because they generate diffuse nonexcludable benefits. The inference might be
that to the degree we observe advocacy from such groups, that effort is underprovided
(compared to the social optimum) because free riding limits contributions to such groups.
Moreover, much of the relevant legislation was enacted when advocacy groups favoring
such legislation were not yet powerful; in the case of environmental legislation enacted in
1969-72, many of the major environmental advocacy groups we know today did not yet
exist or were fledglings (Farber 1992).
Additionally, advocacy groups that purport to mobilize on behalf of the public interest
regularly pursue policy objectives that depart from utilitarian normative criteria. Oates &
Portney (2003), for example, observe that environmental groups historically opposed
incentive-based regulation partly on the ground that these instruments might create
“hotspots” that concentrated the adverse affects of pollution (as discussed above), and
partly because they distrusted markets and favored bureaucratic control. These advocates
instead supported command technology standards rather than taxes or auctioned
allowances, even though most economists viewed command technology standards to be
inferior to incentive-based regulations. Thus many advocacy groups joined with industry
interests who similarly sought to avoid paying for inframarginal emissions (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1975), and the combined result was the positive political choice to adopt
suboptimal instruments. Oates & Portney also note, however, that in recent years,
incentive-based instruments have been more widely adopted, raising the questions
whether these interest groups have either lost influence or have changed their preferences
regarding instrument choice.
An intriguing hypothesis by Yandle (1989) is that many organized groups achieve their
policy objectives only after joining forces with other organized groups, including those
with whom they share little in common or even oppose. Based on the story of the odd
political alliance between Baptists and bootleggers to impose Sunday closing laws on
liquor stores – in which Baptists sought to ban (at least official) liquor sales on the
Sabbath, and bootleggers sought to shut down their (legal) rivals for one day a week –
Yandle suggests that both environmental advocacy groups and industry achieve their
desired policy outcomes when they ally together. Such cooperation thus generates laws
that (purport to) limit pollution and while also favoring one industry segment over
another. This kind of strategy may explain the air pollution laws discussed above that
favored one industry region over another, the choice of command technology standards
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rather than taxes or (auctioned) allowances, and the new/old distinction favoring
incumbents. And it further suggests that while advocacy groups may be influential in
raising issues on the political agenda to spur adoption of laws, their influence is
dependent on joining forces with industry which in turn works to torque the detailed
content of those laws to favor incumbent industry interests (Wiener 1999b).
In addition to advocacy groups, the policymaking process also includes what are
commonly called “policy entrepreneurs” (or political entrepreneurs) who capitalize on
diffuse and even inchoate public preferences to propose and develop support for new
policy designs. Such actors were not emphasized in Olson (1971), perhaps explaining
some of his failure to predict the coming wave of consumer and environmental legislation
and of economic deregulation, but the role of policy entrepreneurs was highlighted by
Wilson (1984: 370-71), Eskridge (1988: 285), Arnold (1990), and Schroeder (1998).
Policy entrepreneurs may serve some or all of at least five kinds of functions. First, they
lower the transaction costs of political awareness and voice through campaigns to collect
and disseminate information. Similarly, policy entrepreneurs monitor policy adoption
and implementation by institutions—monitoring that interest groups are not sufficiently
incentivized to do themselves—by publicizing results and checking lapses in
performance. Second, they construct a narrative or vision of social ills (often including
blame) and of the good society (including the payoffs of action) that help overcome free
riding and mobilize diffuse—or rival—interest groups to advance policy objectives.
Third, rather than merely reflecting existing preferences, policy entrepreneurs anticipate
as-yet unexpressed or unformed future preferences of key constituencies – what Arnold
(1990: 10) calls the ”potential preferences” of voters – and appeal to those forwardmoving preferences. They may go further and shape new preferences through their
narrative and vision. Fourth, they help devise new instruments that reduce costs and
improve performance. This function is illustrated in the role of Environmental Defense
Fund in designing and advocating market-based allowance trading systems to control air
pollution (Keohane et al. 1998: 354; Oates & Portney 2003), and by the roles of
regulatory reformers such as Alfred Kahn (at the Civil Aeronautics Board) and Stephen
Breyer (then chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee) in the 1970s in
deregulating industries such as aviation, banking, and communications (McCraw 1984).
In this capacity, the policy entrepreneur is more innovative and less political than the
interest group competing to reduce costs envisioned by Becker (1983, 1985). The
entrepreneur is not just extracting rents or pursuing policy outcomes but is instead a
creative modernizer who invents a new policy instrument, something akin to a
Schumpeterian innovation in the public sector (Wiener 2001: 1350-52). Policy
entrepreneurship can arise from interest groups on the demand side of regulation, or from
politicians and agencies on the supply side of regulation.
More complicated models give greater attention to the supply side of producing
regulatory policy. These models suggest that Congress or its members may be “trolling”
for interest groups with votes and campaign dollars, in order to “sell” regulatory
legislation to these “buyers” by legislating benefits. Congress can also sell benefits by
exercising power over regulatory agencies to favor targeted interests. Sometimes this
transaction is complicated by rival bidders. Wilson (1984), as noted above, hypothesized
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that Congressional delegation to an agency is most likely when the issue is in conflict
between concentrated interest groups on both the benefits and costs side; he suggested
that Congress would likely write a statute expressing lofty ambitions but leaving the
difficult tradeoffs to the agency. Fiorina (1983) developed a model that predicts when
Congress will delegate to courts versus agencies, and Schwartz, Spiller & Urbiztondo
(1994) similarly suggested when Congress might delegate policymaking to courts
through articulating statutory intent. Lazarus (2004) examined how polarization in
Congress may inhibit regulation.
These delegation decisions—and the models that predict delegation—became especially
significant following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), which not only upheld the agency’s authority to supply a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but in particular, upheld EPA’s interpretation that
the word “source” in the Clean Air Act authorized a form of emissions allowance trading
(EPA’s bubble and netting policy) when Congress had left the statute’s wording unclear.
This case illustrates the role of the agency as policy entrepreneur, and suggests a role for
the courts in interpreting statutes (or deferring to agency interpretations) that promotes
normatively optimal instrument choices and checks the distortionary effects of positive
politics on instrument choice.
A related literature speaks to how Congress designs agencies in crafting and securing its
preferred policy outcomes. Both Bawn (1995) and Epstein & Ohalloran (1994) suggest
that congressional politics can explain certain structural elements of agency design.
McNollGast (1987, 1989) offer models explaining how Congress, through the
Administrative Procedure Act and other procedural devices, established a rulemaking
procedure to ensure that organized interest groups maintain control over agency
policymaking and can alert Congress to agency actions that threaten the interest groups’
deal with Congress. And McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) and Spiller (1990) illustrate
how Congress monitors agencies after delegating to them substantial policymaking
responsibility. This literature explains how Congress can respond to political demands—
and thus reap the benefits from catering to organized interest groups—while still
delegating policymaking responsibilities to agencies. On the other hand, Seidenfeld
(1992) and Spence & Cross (2000) argue that delegation to agencies can reduce the
public choice distortions of Congressional legislation, and Croley (2008) argues that once
such power is delegated, the APA and White House oversight help shield agencies from
Congressional micromanagement – and thus from interest group demands – while
ensuring both transparency and attention to social net benefits in agency rulemaking.
A synthesis of these diverse approaches is developed by Keohane, Revesz & Stavins
(KRS) (1998), which proposes a model with many of the complicating factors discussed
above. KRS offer a supply and demand model to explain both environmental regulatory
instrument choices and when those choices depart from instruments that are normatively
preferred by economists. In their model, Congress is the supplier of regulation to a set of
demanders that includes both the voting public and interest groups. On the demand side,
KRS account for transactions costs of political voice and free riding (in line with Olson
1971 and North 1990, and unlike Aidt 1998) so that interest groups do not fully represent
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public interests but rather promote parochial special interests. Like Yandle (1989), they
allow for multiple interest groups which may compete or enter into coalition alliances.
Like Buchanan & Tullock (1975), they observe that industry prefers command
technology standards rather than taxes or auctioned allowances (because the latter force
firms to pay for residual uncontrolled emissions) and that incumbents prefer tighter
controls on new entrants. And like Oates & Portney (2003), they observe that
environmental groups have also historically preferred command technology standards,
although KRS suggest that niche-seeking competition among environmental groups may
diversify these views toward support for incentive-based instruments (while calling for
more empirical research on what advocacy groups actually seek).
KRS then add attention to the supply side: the provision of legislation by Congress. In
their model, legislators seek re-election, which depends on both votes and interest group
support, but because of a rising marginal cost curve for legislation, interest group
demands cannot be fully met and instead there will be an equilibrium of demand and
supply in the market for legislation. One consequence, they suggest, is that Congress
may prefer command technology standards when it is more costly to learn about newer
incentive-based instruments rather than continue employing familiar traditional
instruments. KRS observe that Congress might also prefer command standards if they
are more effective at dictating the distributional impacts of regulation on constituencies.
(Command standards may more easily dictate the distribution of environmental impacts
than do taxes or allowance trading [which afford “where” locational flexibility in
abatement by sources, and hence reduce costs but may raise concerns about hotspots], but
allowance trading systems may more easily dictate the distribution of compliance costs
through the allocation of allowances among sources.) But like Becker (1983, 1985), KRS
also find that interest groups have incentives to compete over time to offer Congress lesscostly mechanisms to achieve the groups’ desired goals, because Congress cares about
reducing costs in order to attract votes from other affected constituencies. Consequently,
when there is no embedded interest group deal securing existing instruments, incentivebased instruments are more likely to be adopted to address new issues.
KRS argue that these factors combine to help explain the observed shift over time toward
adoption of cap-and-trade allowance systems with allowances allocated for free to
historical users (“grandfathering,” preferred by industry), tight caps (preferred by
environmental groups), fewer total social costs to voters compared to alternative
instruments, and learning over time by legislators about the success of these instruments.
Incentive instruments such as cap-and-trade will also gain a more receptive audience
among legislators when distributional impacts are favorable: when concerns about
hotspots are attenuated (such as for greenhouse gases, which mix globally in the
atmosphere) and when allowance allocations and/or revenues from taxes and allowance
sales can be used to soften the distributional burden of the regulatory policy (DeShazo &
Freeman 2007).
One illustration of this shift in instrument choice can be seen in the policies adopted to
control acid rain from sulfur dioxide emissions in 1977 and 1990. Whereas the 1977
Clean Air Act effectively mandated command technology standards (scrubbers) at coal-
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fired power plants, a choice that favored eastern high-sulfur coal over western low-sulfur
coal (Ackerman & Hassler 1981), the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments imposed quantity
trading (tradable allowances or cap-and-trade), a choice that encouraged coal-fired power
plants to switch from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal. What explains this shift in
instrument choice, and the reversal of eastern coal’s earlier interest group victory?
Joskow & Schmalensee (1998) use a hybrid political economy explanation to account for
the change in regulatory regime. First, consistent with Becker (1983), they argue that the
high social cost of the 1977 command technology instrument led the regulated parties and
Congress to seek a less-costly alternative system in 1990. Additional factors were also at
work. Second, the physical features of the acid rain problem—which prompted the 1990
Amendments—also lent themselves to a cap-and-trade instrument. The emissions of the
targeted pollutant (sulfur dioxide) were spread regionally (diminishing hotspot concerns,
though the issue was still raised), generated by widespread sources with varying costs of
control, and capable of being monitored inexpensively at each smokestack. Third, on the
demand side, acid rain was perceived to be a growing social problem, so the electorate
associated the new law with increasing social benefits.Fourth, on the supply side, changes
in political leadership in the late 1980s helped prompt the policy change by strengthening
the hand of leaders from states receiving acid deposition: in the Senate, Robert Byrd,
from West Virginia, a coal producing state, gave up his post as Senate Majority Leader to
George Mitchell, from Maine, a victim of acid rain; and Ronald Reagan, from California,
was succeeded in the White House by George H.W. Bush, from New England. The
switch to cap and trade in 1990 was also facilitated by a bipartisan learning process called
“Project ’88,” led by Senators Tim Wirth (Democrat) and John Heinz (Republican) and
staffed by Robert Stavins, which explained the success of prior allowance trading
systems (such as in phasing out lead in gasoline) and thus helped legislators learn about
these instruments and their net benefits. And policy entrepreneurs became active in
promoting a policy change. The Environmental Defense Fund – an environmental group
carving out its niche as an advocate of incentive-based instruments - helped design the
1990 Acid Rain Trading Program for the new Bush administration (KRS 1998: 354).
Although the Joskow & Schmalensee hybrid model and the additional factors we have
noted here represent more a mosaic description than a formal model, this analysis reveals
that at least one substantial policy instrument change – on acid rain -- is best understood
by moving beyond the narrow focus on industry interests emphasized by the Olson model
and its progeny, and by instead including a wider array of interests and political forces on
both the demand and supply side. Further analysis could address the use of a cap and
trade instrument design in subsequent air pollution regulation, such as the major Clean
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) promulgated by the Bush administration in 2005 to further
reduce SO2 and NOx emissions.

C. Public Attitudes
The approaches discussed so far focus mainly, though not exclusively, on the role of
organized interest groups in shaping instrument choice. But can the views of
unorganized voters – public attitudes – also influence instrument choice? This subsection
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addresses that question. The answer is yes, but the implications for instrument choice are
mixed.
Several models of democratic governance have incorporated voter sentiments into policy
outcomes. Downs (1957) developed a simple but influential model in which voters, of
varying ideological preferences, acted directly and individually without organized interest
groups. In that model, legislators seeking re-election thus adopt laws that satisfy the
preferences of the median voter. Even in a world of interest groups, public attitudes can
still matter. Denzau & Munger (1986) model the views of the unorganized general public
as the slope of the hill up which interest groups must push their lobbying agenda toward
adoption. That is, the more widely or intensely general public holds a viewpoint on some
issue, the more difficult it is for interest groups to overcome that viewpoint. This idea is
similar to Becker (1983, 1985), in which interest groups compete to offer legislators
policy designs that reduce costs and thereby please the general public (voters), and more
directly entails the approach in KRS (1998), which depicts an upward sloping supply
curve for legislation. Even some of the most formal economic models explicitly
incorporate the influence of popular, dispersed, and unorganized voters (see, e.g.,
Peltzman 1976).
A more ambitious theory of public attitudes goes beyond, or overcomes, interest group
politics, at least in unusual episodes. This is the approach of adherents of “republican
moments” in which mass movements depart from “normal” politics to achieve
transformative political change. Pope (1990) and Morone (1990) discuss the
phenomenon in politics, and Ackerman (1998) argues that such republican moments have
transformed American constitutional law and its understanding at key intervals such as
the New Deal. Farber (1992) sees the wave of environmental legislation enacted in the
early 1970s as a republican moment that overcame interest group politics (rather than
reflected a new interest group alignment). Elliott et al. (1985) explain the early 1970s
wave of environmental law as partly a strategy by national industry to replace a
patchwork of state laws with uniform national laws, and partly a race to the top (to be
more “green”) between presidential candidates Nixon and Muskie, but they do not
address (and appear to assume) the underlying change in public attitudes that evidently
motivated both the enactment of the state laws and the candidates’ race to the top.
Schroeder (1998) argues that the republican moment that spawned the major
environmental laws in the early 1970s was plausibly a result of rational voting and
rational response by elected leaders. Speth (2008) and Purdy (2008) see – or hope for – a
coming transformation in public attitudes to address global climate change.
The theory of republican moments may explain the origin of major laws, but its
implications are unclear for the details of instrument choice. For example, the 1960s/70s
republican moments may have overcome opposition to environmental and consumer
protection, but it is less obvious that the mass movement influenced the choice between
command technology standards, taxes, and allowance trading. It is possible that what are
perceived to be republican moments are actually coalitions of Baptists and bootleggers
(or are coopted by such coalitions), which would help explain why the surge of
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democratic mobilization in the 1970s lead to suboptimal instruments that protect
incumbents (Yandle 1989).
Alternatively, the republican moment may influence instrument choice through framing
effects. Perhaps the narrative of the mass movement, rooted in its critique of markets and
economic growth, also swept aside economic incentive instruments in its zeal for direct
government control, questioning, in effect, whether market-based instruments could be
the solution when market failure is the cause for environmental ills. Depicting markets as
the problem and pollution as a sin requiring expiation may have tilted public support
toward absolutist government edicts (Margolis 1996: 25). Framing market-based
incentive instruments as “licensing the right to pollute” and “commodification” may have
tarnished those instruments in the public eye, even if the reality was otherwise (Nash
2006). It may have taken two or three decades, including experience with successful
market-based incentives and the failure of central planning in the Soviet Union, to change
that public attitude (and legislators’ understanding) toward acceptance of the idea that
market-based incentive instruments can repair and reconstitute markets (Stewart 1986).
It took time to reframe the narrative, saying, in effect: it’s not that the environment is too
important to leave to markets, it’s that the environment is too important to leave out of
markets (Wiener 1999a: 724).
Framing of instrument choice may be catalyzed by crisis events. Public attitudes and
perceptions, including republican moments, appear to be influenced by and responsive to
cognitive heuristics and biases that translate into political mobilization. On heuristics
generally, see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982); Slovic (2000); Sunstein (2005). In
particular, the availability heuristic (Sunstein & Kuran 1999) focuses attention on recent
visible unusual events, leading people to overestimate low-probability risks and
underestimate routine familiar highly likely risks (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982;
Krier & Noll 1990). Thus, crisis events may be crucial in spurring political responses
(Percival 1998; Dominic & Madin 2008). The history of regulation reveals numerous
examples, from the Cuyaoga River catching fire, the death of Lake Erie, and toxic waste
under Love Canal in the 1970s, to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the Enron and
Worldcom scandals, and the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks. Percival (1998: 20-22) argues
that a “trigger” event like these is needed to spur new legislation. A longer memory
includes the Triangle Shirt factory fire, which spurred workplace safety regulation,
although its political impact arguably faded over time (Stein 2007: 787-88). These
theories on the intersection of public attitudes and cognitive heuristics might explain why
certain events trigger republican moments. Still, the relationship is not deterministic.
Some regulation occurs without an immediately preceding crisis event, and not every
crisis event spurs regulation (Kahn 2007). Processes of social amplification are only
triggered in some cases.
Cognitive focus on “available” crisis events also has a crowding-out effect on other
motivations for regulatory policy, as it arguably leads to public neglect of both routine
familiar risks and also remote catastrophic risks. Catastrophic risks, such as asteroid
collisions, abrupt climate change, pandemics (Posner 2004; Sunstein 2007) and financial
collapse (Taleb 2006), threaten huge damages. But these kinds of extreme ultra-low
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probability catastrophic risks are neglected (even as low-probability but “available”
visible crises evoke strong responses) because the catastrophic event occurs so rarely that
it is not within the memorable experience that gives rise to the availability heuristic
(Slovic & Weber 2002). And public attitudes may be subject to “mass numbing,”
responding intensely to the plight of a single individual but remaining unmoved by the
plight of thousands or millions (Slovic 2007).
If so, the upshot is that the public responds to recent visible crises (more strongly than do
experts, who calculate probability times impact), but the public neglects (compared to
experts) both routine widespread risks and rare catastrophic risks. Breyer (1993) and
Posner (2004) bemoaned the influence of these heuristics on public attitudes, and in turn
on Congressional priority-setting, as a suboptimal distortion of regulatory priorities that
Breyer (1993) termed the “vicious circle.” Thaler & Sunstein (2008) propose
opportunities to use framing effects proactively to shape heuristics and improve
regulatory policy.
The influence on instrument choice of these heuristic public attitudes requires additional
inquiry. The crisis-response dynamic and its framing narrative may tend to favor
regulatory designs that employ strict government edicts (“never again”or “zero
tolerance”), such as command technology standards in environmental policy, stringent
regulation of financial institutions, and aggressive homeland security policies that
impinge on liberty and privacy. On the other hand, financial crises have often been met
with adoption of strong information disclosure instruments (both in the New Deal
securities laws, and in the Sarbanes-Oxley law following the Enron and Worldcom
scandals). Likewise, the Bhopal chemical plant disaster was followed by the information
disclosure requirements in the Toxics Release Inventory (enacted in 1986) and the risk
management plans under Clean Air Act section 112(r) (enacted in 1990). These
examples suggest a role for incentive-based instruments in some cases of crisis response.
And to forestall what some call a looming climate crisis, the current political enthusiasm
for cap-and-trade instruments (as opposed to other instruments) to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions appears to derive from several factors: the expected cost savings, learning over
time about instruments, the desire for effective caps on emissions, and the distributional
attractiveness of deploying some allowance allocations to mollify critics and recycling
allowance auction revenues to cut other taxes, all with little or no risk of environmental
hotspots (DeShazo & Freeman 2007; Wiener 2008). Perhaps actually experiencing a
major climate crisis (worse than Hurricane Katrina – say, Greenland ice melting and
flooding lower Manhattan and Florida) – would spur adoption of instruments that are not
so incentive-based, such as geoengineering strategies to cool the planet directly.
In sum, public attitudes appear to affect instrument choice, through unorganized voters’
preferences, episodic republican moments, and heuristic framing effects especially after
available crisis events. But the direction and degree of amplification of these effects on
instrument choice is mixed or unclear. Further empirical research could seek to
disentangle these effects and test their relative influence.
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D. Positive Choice at the International and Supranational Level
The theories and evidence assessed thus far have all examined positive politics in the
United States, at the federal level. That system has particular constitutional features,
including voting and election systems, campaign finance laws, legislative majority rule, a
bicameral national legislature, separation of powers with the possibility of a presidential
veto, federalism with the possibility of subnational regulation, and judicial review. It also
has a distinct political culture. These features are obviously different in other political
systems. Many countries employ parliamentary legislative systems, in which the prime
minister necessarily has a majority in the legislature. Some impose restrictions on
political expenditures by interest groups, and some have more deferential doctrines of
judicial review.
These and other kinds of variation in political institutions seem bound to affect the
positive politics of mechanism choice. Below we suggest further research on this
question.
A comparative analysis of the positive politics of instrument choice across countries is a
worthy endeavor but beyond the scope of this paper. Here we offer two examples of
positive instrument choice in other systems that may help put the US system and
experience in context: international environmental treaties, and the European Union.
Both illustrate the importance of the voting rule for adoption of law (see Buchanan &
Tullock 1962).
1. International environmental regulation: CFCs and GHGs
There is no strong positive theory of global regulation. Standard public choice theory
predicts even less regulation at the global level than at the national level because global
beneficiaries are even more diffuse, industry cost-bearers are still concentrated, and –
crucially –the voting rule for international treaties holds that countries must consent to be
bound and hence must perceive national net benefits (broadly construed) to decide to join
(unlike national majority rule or fiat, which can impose costs on dissenters) (Wiener
1999a, 1999b). As Farber (1997: 1314) reports, “The basic principle of international
law, after all, is that it binds states only with their own consent.”
Moreover, rent-seeking (and the bootlegger side of Baptist-bootlegger coalitions) might
seem more difficult under the consent voting rule at the international level than under the
majority or fiat voting rule at the national level. Rent-seeking depends on the coercive
power of the state to shift gains from losers to winners (Wiener 1999b: 769-771; Posner
1971; Posner 1974: 344; Peltzman 1976). Indeed, Mueller (1976: 401-03 & n.9) opined
that for this reason, rent-seeking in international agreements is “out of the question,”
though adding a caveat that there may be distributional battles over the joint gains from
cooperation. Moe (1990: 221, 222 n.9) argued that “the unique thing about public
authority is that whoever gets to exercise it has the right to tell everyone else what to do,
whether they want to do it or not .... Public authority gives [the winners] the right to make
themselves better off at [the loser's] expense. Their decisions are legitimate and binding.
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... This kind of outcome-- redistribution that makes some people better off and some
people worse off-- is alien to the economic world of voluntary exchange.” According to
this view, one would expect little, if any, rent-seeking regulation in the international
arena of voluntary agreements.
Yet as an empirical matter, the reality is that there is significant regulation at the global
level, more than would be expected under standard public choice theory. And there are
some attempts at rent-seeking under international treaty regimes as well (Wiener 1999b;
Mattli & Woods 2009). Countries are complex plural entities, not monoliths, so rentseeking can occur within each country governed by majority rule or more coercive
institutions; but regulation and rent-seeking are more surprising under the consent rule of
international treaties. Seeking to explain this puzzle, Keohane (1983) and Ostrom &
Keohane (1996) compare global treaty law to local systems of group property and argue
that international regimes arise to facilitate the benefits of cooperation. Such regimes
can succeed in situations of low transaction costs, repeat playing (long-term
relationships), strong social norms, direct benefits and side payments to cooperate, and
monitoring and sanctions for violations. Wiener (1999a, 1999b) hypothesizes that
consent-based political systems (such as international law) are (i) less likely to adopt law
than are more coercive political systems such as fiat or majority rule; (ii) less likely to
adopt laws that impose costs or adverse side effects on parties than are more coercive
systems such as national law; and, when they do adopt regulatory law, consent-based
political systems such as international treaties are (iii) more likely to adopt allowance
trading than to adopt either command technology standards or taxes. The first two
hypotheses are consistent with Buchanan & Tullock (1962) who show that as the voting
rule moves along the spectrum from fiat to majority to unanimity (i.e., from coercive to
non-coercive systems), the costs of adopting law rise but the costs imposed on dissenters
decline. The third hypothesis on the pattern of instrument choice follows, Wiener (1999a)
suggests, from the lack of coercion and the need for side payments at the international
level, which mean that allowance trading is better able (i.e. at less cost than alternative
instruments) to attract participation, through the allocation of allowances.
For example, in the treaty negotiations over whether to phase out CFCs to protect the
stratospheric ozone layer (a global public good), cooperation among countries required
extensive negotiations and, ultimately, side payments to China and India through the
Montreal Protocol Fund. In selecting the regulatory instrument, the 1987 Montreal
Protocol regime set quantity limits on production and authorized a limited form of
allowance trading called “industrial rationalization.” Meanwhile, rent-seeking was
significant: US manufacturers of CFCs, who had initially opposed international controls
on CFCs, switched positions in 1986 to press for an aggressive phaseout of CFCs in the
Montreal Protocol, in part because they perceived profit opportunities in the new regime.
Since US manufacturers were farther ahead in the production of CFC substitutes than
were their competitors, a rapid CFC phaseout, although it would cost them some, would
hurt their rivals far more (Wiener 1999b: 772-73; Litfin 1994: 108; Hammit & Thompson
1997: 43; McInnis 1992: 129). Although the US manufacturers no doubt would claim
credit for making socially valuable investments in new products, their cooperation in the
Montreal Protocol is clearly also consistent with an alignment of bootleggers and
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Baptists, in which a rent-seeking industry sought to burden its rivals while environmental
advocates sought to protect the planet. The Montreal Protocol’s success also shows that
such rent-seeking could occur in the international arena within a consent framework that
constituted a Pareto improvement to all parties (countries). Indeed, a curiosity here is
that the rival CFC producers (such as in Europe) went along – or perhaps were obliged to
do so within their own national political systems.
The negotiations over the international climate change treaties also illustrate the
importance of the voting rule. Progress has been slow because countries must consent to
be bound, and several key countries have demurred. The US never ratified and then
withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in part because the US Senate had voted 95-0 in
1997 not to ratify a treaty which lacked parallel commitments by major developing
countries. China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and other major developing countries have
also resisted agreeing to limits on their future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. No
doubt rent-seeking efforts are rife as different industries and energy sources seek to raise
rivals’ costs through the restrictions imposed and subsidies doled out under a climate
treaty regime. Meanwhile, as to instrument choice, when the US advocated allowance
trading in the 1990s, the idea encountered initial opposition from many quarters, notably
the European Union; but after considerable effort by the US to explain the benefits of
allowance trading for greenhouse gases, that instrument was authorized informally in the
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and more formally in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol (Wiener 2001). A cap-and-trade system is likely to be the instrument adopted in
future US and international climate policy as well because it enables cost savings, a cap
on emissions, and a distribution of burden and of headroom allowances that best attracts
participation, without inducing hotspots (Wiener 1999a; DeShazo & Freeman 2007).
In the absence of formal international governance regimes, there is still room for “private
governance,” including self-regulation by multinational corporations, codes of conduct
promulgated by international organizations, and consumer standards monitored by NGOs
(Gereffi & Mayer 2006). Although private governance arrangements often arise in
response to calls by consumer and political activists (Spar & La Mure 2003), they are
also regularly products of rent-seeking and are sustained by industry initiatives not unlike
those exercised in domestic politics (Wiener 1999b). Private coalitions that drive the
formation of international agreements often resemble the purest forms of Baptistbootlegger coalitions, because political sentiment is so thin and political monitoring so
sparse in the international arena. Examples of coalitions with surprising bedfellows
include the Kimberley Process, in which NGOs paired with DeBeers to remove conflict
diamonds from the consumer market and to remove alluvial competitors from global
supply (Richman 2009).
2. European Union environmental regulation: GHGs
Historically, the EU has preferred environmental taxes over allowance trading (Andersen
1994; Svendsen 1998; Wallart 1999; Harrington et al. 2004). In the 1990s, the EU
proposed a carbon tax and denounced the US proposal of allowance trading for GHGs.
But no EU carbon tax was adopted, and starting in 2001 the EU instead adopted
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allowance trading for GHGs. It has now implemented the EU Emissions Trading System
(ETS), the largest cap-and-trade system in the world. Why the switch in instrument
choice?
Several factors help explain this shift that do not relate to the European Union’s
supranational institiutions. When the EU finally turned to implementing its Kyoto
commitments, it realized that the ETS would impose lower costs than would command
standards. (But a tax would arguably have imposed even lower costs.) Moreover, by
2001 the EU had been able to learn from the successful US experience with SO2
allowance trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act, as well as from several other cap-andtrade systems in the US, Canada, New Zealand, and elsewhere, and came to realize its
benefits. (For discussions of Canada’s and New Zealand’s successful tradable permit
systems to curb overfishing, see Wyman 2005 and Newell et al. 2005.) The successes of
allowance trading in the US and the benefits of this instrument for GHG control were
presented to EU leaders in numerous fora, including an early seminar on market-based
environmental policies organized by US government officials (including Richard Stewart,
Richard Schmalensee, and Jonathan Wiener) in February 1990 for officials from the EU
and other countries during an IPCC session. This conversation continued through the
1990s, and the great success of the US acid rain trading program put to rest many
concerns about cap and trade (see Svendsen 1998). Relatedly, policy entrepreneurs
brought the theory and evidence of allowance trading systems from the US to the
European Commission (Peter Zapfel, who studied with Rob Stavins and Richard Newell
at the Kennedy School, is now one of the key staffers at the European Commission
running the EU ETS). And although the EU denounced allowance trading in the 1990s in
part for reasons of symbolic politics – in order to shame the US and seek the upper hand
in post-Cold War international relations -- after George W. Bush withdrew the US from
the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the EU could easily shame the US without disparaging
allowance trading.
Thus, by 2001, allowance trading had become a more politically and functionally
appealing instrument for the EU and its member states. But a tax might still have looked
more attractive to EU decision makers. To understand the EU’s shift from taxes to
allowance trading, it helps to appreciate that the EU voting rules also played a critical
role. EU law required unanimity or consent among EU member states to adopt an EU
tax, but poorer EU member states objected to a uniform carbon tax and blocked adoption.
A cap-and-trade system, by contrast, attracted consent because extra allowances could be
distributed to poorer member states. Allowance trading enabled the initial distribution of
burden to be decoupled from the question of the stringency of the cap and the market
price for an allowance, whereas a tax could not be adjusted as easily to accommodate the
comparative needs of the poorer member states. The EU voting rules requiring unanimity
significantly affected the ultimate mechanism chosen to control GHGs, favoring trading
over taxes, as hypothesized by Wiener (1999a, 1999b).
These two cases – international treaties and the supranational EU system – indicate the
importance of voting rules and political institutions in the positive choice of policy
instruments beyond the US context. They also illustrate the fruitfulness of examining
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how cross-national variation affects instrument choice, and implicate directly some of our
suggestions for future research.

IV. Future Research
The literatures on positive and normative mechanism choice are already extensive, and
we do not pretend to envision the entire future of this field of research. We instead offer
here a few suggestions for future research, with a focus on the theory and evidence of
positive politics – that is, on the public choice of mechanism choice.
A. Voting Rules. Since at least Buchanan & Tullock (1962), scholars have investigated
how different voting rules affect politics. We have sketched here some variation in
regulatory outcomes that can be explained by differences between, for example, the
American versus European political systems. We encourage future research to examine
more systematically how positive instrument choice is affected by alternative voting
rules. Voting rules to be compared include fiat (e.g. dictatorships, Presidential executive
orders, or edicts from corporate CEOs), majority rule (the standard case of rule by N/2 +
1), supermajority rule (e.g. 60 votes out of 100 needed to end debate in the US Senate, or
67 votes out of 100 needed for the US Senate to ratify a treaty), bicameralism (votes
required in both the House and Senate, see Stearns (1994)), separation of powers
(requiring both legislative vote and executive signature), consent (e.g. nations’ consent to
an international treaty, neighbors’ consent to restrictive covenants, or firms’ consent to
binding contracts), and unanimity (the extreme case of universal veto). This research
would easily translate into normative conclusions about the optimal instrument under
each voting rule. And we encourage inquiry into how options for side payments –
mechanisms to compensate losers and thereby attract additional votes or consent – can be
incorporated into alternative political systems.
B. Scale. The size of the polity, communications among members, and vertical (federal)
relations may also affect positive choice among instruments. For example, the role of
interest groups (factions), public attitudes, and regulators may differ at each scale
(Revesz 2001). Madison worried in Federalist 10 that small polities would be more
vulnerable to capture by factions, but others may worry that large-scale polities are more
vulnerable to interest group capture because the transaction costs are higher for
unorganized voters to learn about and monitor political decisions at higher scales.
Innovations such as the internet may affect those costs. Research should pursue these
questions of scale, information costs, administrative institutions, monitoring,
enforcement, and culture, to investigate how they may influence instrument choice at the
local, state, national, and international levels.
C. Constitutions. In addition to, or perhaps combining, the above issues of voting rules
and scale, research could compare positive instrument choice in different constitutional
systems of government, such as republics (with separation of powers), parliamentary,
authoritarian, and other systems. For example, some have argued that public goods are
protected better by democracies than by dictatorships (Congleton 1996: ch. 12), while
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others have alleged the converse (Ophuls 1977). Among democracies, one might
investigate whether parliamentary systems are more likely to select certain policy
instruments than are separation of powers systems like the US Congress in which
opposing parties may control the legislature and the executive (Krehbiel 1998); and
within each legislature, whether different committees (King 1997) or legislative
procedures (Krehbiel 1992) affect instrument choice. Of particular interest might be how
constitutional designs enshrine current regulatory systems and make reform either more
or less difficult. Examining political feedback mechanisms to understand how initial
mechanism choice becomes an explanatory variable for future mechanism selections,
would contribute to our understanding of policy outcomes and change. To be sure, path
dependency is a common explanation for why policy instruments continue beyond their
intended life, and mimicry might also explain parallels in mechanism selection across
policy domains. But political institutions also shape debate, perceptions, and resource
allocations that can affect the political process. Understanding the endogeneity of such
mechanism selections might require more sophisticated models than those discussed here.
D. Topical domains. We also encourage additional inquiry into how instrument choice
varies across topical domains, such as environmental protection, energy,
communications, transportation, workplace safety, food safety, financial markets, and
homeland security. In this paper, several models (e.g. Wilson 1984, McNollGast 1987,
and Keohane, Revesz & Stavins 1998) discuss how different kinds of institutions might
be prone to different instrument choices. Future research might focus on how the
particular attributes of different topical areas might call for different types of instruments
(both normatively and in positive politics). For example, environmental protection might
be better addressed with instruments that differ from those best used in financial
regulation, communications, homeland security, or food safety.
E. Behavioral sciences. New research in behavioral psychology, economics and
neuroscience also offer significant returns to understanding mechanism choice. Taken
together, the burgeoning research in behavioral law and economics, neuroscience,
psychology, and political science collectively offer opportunities to understand the
sources and consequences of phenomena such as framing, biases, crises and availability
heuristics, remote catastrophic risks, trust or distrust in social institutions, and related
factors. This improved understanding of actual behavior may be useful to the study of
instrument choice in at least three ways. First, better understanding of these and other
behavioral factors may help predict which instruments will likely be adopted in response
to particular conditions. For example, as discussed above, some analyses suggest that
market-based instruments often arise in response to mid-level crises, whereas major
crises that seize the public’s attention often result in command-and-control regulation,
especially if a narrative emerges from the crisis that demands expiation of sin and
stringent edicts. But we also noted counterexamples of market-based incentives adopted
in response to major crises in financial and environmental settings. Second, better
understanding of behavioral factors may also help predict the influence of different
instruments on human behavior. For example, research is evolving on how instruments
such as penalties, price signals, information disclosure and warning labels may actually
alter patterns of human response, sometimes contradicting or qualifying the claims made
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in normative theories of instrument choice about how such instruments will function
(e.g., Ariely 2008). Third, behavioral research may help identify new types of
instruments that can influence human responses more effectively or less intrusively
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008). The behavioral science of instrument choice deserves
additional attention, and a satisfying inquiry will likely require involve methodologies
and perspectives.
F. Political Institutions and Instruments. Finally, though we are wary of the search for a
single grand theory, we encourage the pursuit of models that integrate demand, supply,
entrepreneurship, public attitudes, and institutions, in order to shed more light on how the
spectrum of different political systems intermeshes with the spectrum of alternative
regulatory instruments. Although significant work has examined cross-national variation
in political design (see, e.g., Berger & Dore 1996), we lack a dynamic understanding of
how political templates correspond to templates of regulatory instruments. And although
there is a broad literature on the diffusion or transplantation of judicial doctrines across
countries (Watson 1993), we are still groping toward a solid understanding of the
diffusion or borrowing of approaches to administrative regulation across political systems
(Lazer 2005; Wiener 2001, 2006).
*

*

*

Regulatory policy and mechanism design research have advanced a long way from the
traditional template that called for command-and-control regulation to correct market
failures; the menu of instrument choices in the toolbox continues to grow, and the
selections actually made by legislators and regulators appear to be following somewhat
more closely the normative recommendations of analysts. Positive political research that
predicted parochial rent-seeking regulation, based mainly on the behavior of organized
interest groups, has been puzzled by contrary evidence, such as the growth of generalinterest legislation, the deregulation of economic regulation, and the shift toward
adoption of incentive-based allowance trading systems in the US and EU. And yet we
also observe rent-seeking within ostensibly general interest legislation and in
international treaty regimes. Moreover, dynamic and behavioral factors play important
roles. In response, research has sought to incorporate a broader array of explanatory
factors in more sophisticated models and hypotheses. And empirical research is needed
to test each hypothesis. Together, these are moves toward a more comprehensive
understanding of mechanism choice.
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